# Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Institutional Ownership, and Firm Value

by Ludwina Harahap

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#### Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Institutional Ownership, and Firm Value

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Abstract. This empirical study examines the relationship between CSR, corporate governance, and organizational performance 59 irm value in an emerging country. For th 32 udy, the five-year panel data from 2017 to 2020 are obtained through content analysis of annual reports. The study applied fixed effects on a panel data regression model to a panel of Indonesian manufacturing companies in Indonesia. We find that CSR, corporate governance structure by institutional ownership, and size positively link firm value, while profitability can't show a significant relationship. The results of this study provide evidence of Shleifer and Vishny's statements that institutional ownership is 36 pareholder who is very concerned about social performance, the environment, and governance and monitoring mechanisms, particularly in emerging economies such as Indonesia. This study also sheds light on the observed association between CSR, governance, and Firm Performance.

Keywords: Please list your keywords in this section.

#### 1 Introduction

The issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Indonesia is increasing 24 concern after the issuance of the Minister of Environment Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2014 concern 24 the Company Performance Rating Assessment Program (PROPER) in environmental m 54 gement and the Limited Liability Company Law (UU PT) No. 40 Article 7 22 f 2007 that every company is obliged to carry out social and environmental responsibilities. Surprisingly, the popularity of CSR practices increases as well as their complication and bureaucratization, which naturally leads to an increase in the amount of research [1]–[4]. CSR is an essential part of sustainability issues within the SDG's framework. In line with the increasing attention to CSR practices carried out by companies as a form of social responsibility to their stakeholders, good governance is also an important part that the company must achieve in the era of VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complicity, and ambiguity.

CSR activities are carried out and become part of the company's strategy to improve the company's performance, including being part of governance that guarantees stakeholders of the company's social responsibility. Corporate governance and CSR are two things that cannot be separated and interrelated from the company's activities [5]. CSR is a 17 m of corporate accountability to stakeholders [6]–[9]. It is part of a corporate governance mechanism to ensure that no party is harmed due to information asymmetry and the interests of other parties [10], [11].

Several studies reveal that one of the determinants of CSR strategies carried out by companies is adaptive governance. Governance is a flexible action system that combines strategy and how the company assigns its responsibilities to shareholders and stakeholders [12]. Besides that, based on extensive research has documented the positive in 3 cts of CSR; are higher firm valuation, lower cost of capital, lower cost of high leverage, higher existing, higher value of cash holdings, better earnings quality, and CSR as the main issue into investor's decisions, and it also exerts a 27 nificant influence on their portfolio firms' CSR policies (see Arouri & Pijourlet, 2017; Attig et al., 2013; Bae et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020; Dyck et al., 2019; El Ghoul et al., 2011, 2018; El Ghoul & Karoui, 2017; Hmaittane et al., 2019]

Some empirical studies have shown mixed results regarding the role of CSR in helping to improve company performance and firm value [16], [22]–[31]. The diversity of findings opens up future research opportunities to explore variables that help to aplain theoretical and empirical views. This study was conducted using institutional ownership as a proxy for internal corporate goverance in exploring the relationship and influence of CSR, governance, and firm value. Studies on the role of Institutional ownership in improving company performance and firm value have been conducted by previous researchers [32]–[37]. Empirical research shows mixed and inconsistent results, so more research is needed in this field by exploring variables and other emerging phenomena.

#### 2 Literature Review

#### 2.1. Agenzy theory and Information Asymmetry

One of the most widely used theories in literature is agency theory. It was proposed by [38] dan [39]. An agency relationship was a relationship between the owner of the company and the company's manager. The company manager was a representative of the company's owner to run the 7 ompany. On the other hand, this agency relationship also triggered agency conflicts between the two. Agency problems were increased due to the 7 ymmetry of information among owners and managers. Managers have an in 7 tive to behave opportunistically to serve their interests, but this may abuse shareholders' interests The problem resulted from agency theory is one of the main motivations for ownership structure [40]. The agency theory proposes an effective corporate governance mechanism that eliminates conflicts between owners and managers and benefits all company sharehol (23).

Information asymmetry between managers and owne 53 esults in moral hazards and self-serving actions because of conflicts of interests between both parties [41]. 12 decrease agency conflicts, the owners should implement monitoring and incentive-alignment mechanisms. Agency theory states that conflicts of interest and information asymmetries that arise can be reduced by a proper monitoring mechanism to align the interests of the 13 ious parties within the company. One of the tools used is good corporate governance. The corporate governance mechanism is a rule, procedure, and transparent relationship between the decision-making parties and the controlling parties conducting the control or supervising the decision taken. Effective corporate governance combines both internal and external mechanisms [42].

#### 2.2. Stakeholders Theory

The Stakeholder theory states that a business has relationships with a broader set of stakeholders, including employees, consumers 4 overnments, environmental advocates, and others, beyond shareholders and acts as a guide to understanding a firm's responsibilities. It suggests that the firm has a contractual relationship with all stakeholders, enabling 4 rms to be managed for the benefit of all their stakeholders in the financial and 4 enon-financial domain [43]. Stakeholders are the individuals or groups who have ownership, rights, or interests in a business [44]. Internal stakeholders include employees and investors; external 4 keholders include consumers, community members, and the environment. The external stakeholders such as customers, communities, and the environment might offer new knowledge pools which can be developed as essential sources of innovation [45], [46][46].

Stakeholder theory has developed in developed countries and empirically provides for the enactment of stakeholder theory in a country with a stable institutional environment and effective implementation of investor protection of rules and regulations (Lu & Li, 2019; Narbel &, 2017). Meanwhile, it does not work in Indonesia and other countries where the protection mechanism of investors is weak, and the authorities have not required corporate governance as a mechanism that provides practical tools in directing corporate strategic decisions related to CSR and ensuring better corporate financial performance.

#### 2.3. Corporate Governa

Cadbury, 2000 defines 2 corporate governance as a system by which companies are directed and controlled. CG is derived from compliance, accountability, and transparency [50], and managers deploy their functions through compliance with existing regulatory laws and codes of conduct [49]. The implementation of CG lies in the ongoing activities to perfect the laws, regulations, and contracts governing the operations of the company and ensure that shareholder rights are fulfilled, the anterests of stakeholders and managers are maintained, and maintain transparency, and each party assumes its responsibilities and contributes to the growth and value creation of the company [51]. Governance sets the organization's tone, and power is exerted and decision-making. When we view CG from a broader perspective, it is a concept that emphasizes business responsibility towards a wide range of stakeholders who provide the resources necessary for survival, competitiveness, and success [50]. Thus, the company is responsible for the right and wealth of shareholders and employees, suppliers, customers, and investors. Furthermore, the company is obliged to guarantee the interests of all stakeholders movements [51], [52]. **48** 

CG is also on aspects of corporate leadership and strategy regulation, set to define roles and responsibilites, orienting management towards the company's long-term performance vision, establishing appropriate resource allocation plans, contributing external knowledge, expertise, and information, performing various supervisory functions, and leading company stakeholders in the expected direction [49]–[51].

#### 2.4. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

The rise of globalization, international trade transactive and the complexity of business, and pressure from developed countries demand increased transparency and corporate social responsibility as a form of good

corporate citizenship. The needs of the community that cannot be met by the ability of the government (D. Jamali, 2006) also encourage the role of businesses to pay more attention to their responsibilities to stakeholders. In addition to having economic obligations to their shareholders, businesses ar 2 equired to fulfil social responsibility to the community or widely known as CSR. It is a business commitment to contribute sustainably to economic development, working with employees, families, and local communities (WBCSD, 2001). Another definition of CSR is a set of policies, practices, and programs integrated across business operations and decision-making processes and intended to ensure a company maximizes the positive impact of its operations on society (Busi 2 ss for Social Responsibility, 2003). The most common conceptualization of CSR is Carroll, 1979, mentions four types of CSR, namely, economics (employment, wages, services), law (legal compliance and play by the rules of the game), ethical (being moral and doing w 40)s fair, entitled, and just) and discretionary (optional philanthropic contributions). Added by [57] means CSR into three: ett 111, generous, and strategic. Ethical CSR is morally mandatory and runs in addition to fulfilling the company's economic and legal obligations for its responsibility to avoid social harm or injury, even in cases where the business is not directly profitable. Altruistic CSR is humanitarian. Philanthropic CSR involves genuine optional caring, whether the company will benefit financially or not, and efforts to alleviate public problems (e.g., poverty, illiteracy) to improve society's well-being and quality of life. On the other 2 and, strategic CSR is strategic philanthropy that aims to achieve a strategic company's objectives and seeks to identify activities and deeds beto ved both for business and society.

Many scholars also consider CSR to include two dimensions: internal and external. At the internal level, companies revise their internal priorities and conform to diligence for their responsibilities to internal stakeholders, addressing issues related to skills and education, workplace safety, working conditions, human rights, equity considerations, equal opportunity, health and safety, and labor rights [58]. 2s for the external dimensions of CSR –recognized to receive more attention in the literature [59] – companies' priority shifts to the need to assume duties as citizens and provide due diligence to their external economic and social stakeholders and the natural environment [60]. Environmental components primarily address processes, products, and services on the environment, biodiversity, and human health. At the same time, the social bottom line combines societal issues, social justice, public issues, and public controversies.

#### 2.5. CSR and Firm Value

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CSR is an important determinant for the long-term growth and profitability of the business and geourages management to work to create prosperity for all stake olders of the company (Ansong, 2017; Baccaro et al., 2014; Lins et al., 2017). Most use stakeholder theory to explain the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate performance. Under stakeholder theory, the company is obliged to meet the expectations or interests of all stakeholders, including shareholders, lenders, employees, business partners, and the general public in general. The managers are responsible for fulfilling expectations from interested parties [65]. Donaldson & Preston, 1995 state that The eting the expectations and rights of stakeholders can help achieve the company's goals. Some studies tried set was not be impact of social responsibility on firm performance [67]– [73]. Other studies found that CSR is positively related to corporate financial performance. CSR helps the company in managing the relationship with stakeholders and reducing conflicts of interestations the multiple stakeholders[67], [71], [72], [74]–[78]. However, due to inconsistent empirical evidence, this study in <u>30</u> igates the impact of CSR on firm performance and the role of institutional ownership. Hence: Hypothesis 1: corporate social responsibility has a positive impact on firm value.

#### 2.6. Corporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, CSR, and firm value

Several literature suggest that other than cultural, social, legal, and financial factors, the ownership structure and the internal corporate governance mechani 57 play an essential role in determining the allocation of resources for the firms [79]–[83]. The efficacy and appropriateness of activism by institutional ownership improved corporate governance, and it has positive externalities because the monitoring benefits all shareholders. A Corporation with good governance also has financial and nonfinancial work [84]. The ownership structure is an there corporate governance proxy investigated in the literature.

The role of institutional investors is more favorable in those countries where investor protection mechanism is weak [35], [85]. In contrast, with their power of the vote, these expert investors may d 15 pline the management and motivate them to allocate financial resources for CSR activities [86]. The institutional monitoring provides incentives for managers to focus on the firm's longer-term rat 3 r than shorter-term prospects, thus, counteracting tendencies toward management. Those owners with a larger stake or market knowledge and expertise have greater influ<sup>1</sup>ce in strategic decision-making.

Some researchers concluded that a higher level of institutional ownership is tequate to influence the strategic decision-making of the corporations [89], [90]. Other literature from Yao, S. et al., 2011 examined that institutional shareholding is a critical determinant of CSR disclosure and good performance for the firms in China.

However, the effect of firms' value creation and appropriation on the linkage between CSR and firm performance has not be 14 fully explored [92]. Based on the background, the hypothesis is: Hypothesis 2: institutional ownership has a positive impact on firm value

#### Control variables 27

To control institutional ownership, corporate social responsibility, and firm value relations hips and consider the disparity among firms, this study has also used control varial 51; firm size and profitability [35], [79]. Hence, the third and fourth hypotases are : Hypothesis 3: profitability has a positive impact on firm value and hypothesis 4: the size of the firm has a positive impact on firm value.

#### 3. Data and Methodology Data Sources and Variables

W44 ed two sets of data: one set of financial variables and another set of CG variable for institutional 34 hership. Content analysis is used to gather data manually from the annual reports of the sample companies. The population for this research i 31 food and beverage companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Forhange (IDX) for 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. The following firms were excluded from the empirical analysis: companies that have been delisted, suspended, or otherwise have data missing during this research period. Sample

We used purposive sagphing to analysed an unbalanced panel of 48 firms year from the final selected sample. The data related to the firm's performance measures (Tobin's Q) and control variables are computed from the consolidated financial statements and relating to CSR, institutional ownership are taken from the annual report.

#### Dependent Variables

The research adopted market-based performance measures (i.e., Tobin's Q) as regressands. Tobin's Q is a matter measure of a firm's performance, and it measures the firm's value from the investors' perspective. TQ [93] is the ratio between a phy a asset's market value and its replacement value. The market value of a company's assets is measured by its outstanding stock and debt, whilst the replacement cost of assets is measured using their book value [32]. Tobin's Q is considered a reliable measure of performance when used to evaluate the firm's performance based on ownership structure and corporate governance policies, particularly related to financing, dividend disbursement, and compensation for social welfare [94]. A ratio of 1 or more indicates that the firm's market value exceeds its recorded assets. It is considered that investors have a good opportunity to invest in this firm.

#### Independent Variables

#### Corporate social responsibility (CSR)

The method to 50 data for CSR uses content analysis. The study calculated the CSR using a dummy variable. Value 1 for the dan nilai 0 untuk item yang tidak diungkapkan, total pengungkapan yang telah ditentukan GRI sebanyak 91 item pengungkapan. In this study, the Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure index (CSRDI) uses standards of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) with 91 indicators (items) of activities carried out by companies. CSRDI is by GRI Ustainability reporting guidelines standards which consist of 3 main categories those are economic, environmental, and social perf 13 ance. The CSR variable took the value of 1 for firm's disclosure GRI item in a given year and 0 otherwise. Then the value of each item is added up to obtain the overall CSR value of a company and compared to the GRI G4 reporting standard guidelines per their respective categories.



CSRDI xi

n

Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Index sum of all item disclosed by the firm in a given year j

- all item disclosure of GRI G4, n= 91

#### Institutional ownership (IO)

We obtain institutional ownership information from the annual report to construct institutional ownership measures and define it as the shares held by the other institutions in the firm's ownership structure, not individual ownership. For analysis, this study computed this variable by taking a fraction of shares held by all types of

institutions in the f	irm to the total numbers of	the shares of the firms	, and it can be	e calculated with t	he help of the
following formula.					

= Total numbers of shares held by institutional investors Total numbers of shares of the firms

#### Control variables

Ю

Based on several studica [35], [95]–[97], this research include some firm-level variables to control for various factors that may affect the institutional ownership, corporate governance and performance relationships and to consider the disparity among firms. In particular, we include total assets in millions of rupiahs as proxies for firm size (Firm Size), and profitability by the ratio of return on assets (ROA).

#### 4. Empirical Results and Analysis

#### 4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of CSR, institutional ownership, corporate variables, and control variables. The 35 un of CSR was 0.275. However, the maximum value of CSR was 0.363. Even some regulated regulated by a size CSR Law No. 40-2007 on Limited Liability Company and Law No.25-2007 on Investment, which gives CSR in Indonesia an attribute of compulsion. The average institutional ownership ratio was 0,654, but the maximum 14, 99.8%. The profitability mean was 0.062, and the maximum profitability value was 0.223. The size variable has a mean value of 3.370, a minimum of 3.302 and a maximum of 3.488. The firm value measured by price to book value has a mean of 2.842 and a standard deviation of 1.496.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
CSR	<mark>0</mark> .275	0.264	<mark>0</mark> .058	<mark>0</mark> .187	<mark>0</mark> .363
PROF	<mark>0</mark> .062	<mark>0</mark> .054	<mark>0</mark> .078	- <mark>0</mark> .121	0.223
SIZ	3.370	3.366	0.053	3.302	3.488
IOW	0.654	0.616	0.227	0.156	0.998
PBV	2.842	2.669	1.496	0.581	6.857

Note: CSR is total economic, social and employee indicator item disclosure divided into 91 items. PROF is profitability using ROA, SIZ is log natural total assets, IOW is institutional ownership ratio, and PBV is a price to book value.

#### Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables.

Table 2. Correlation Matrix CSR IOW PROF SIZE PBV CSR 1.000000 0.655232 0.249552 -0.190408 0.126265 IOW 0.655232 1.000000 0.260966 -0.0584850.638067

	PROF	0.249552	0.260966	1.000000	-0.111268	0.249227
	SIZ	-0.190408	-0.058485	-0.111268	1.000000	-0.026822
<b>PBV</b> 0.126265 0.638067 0.249227 -0.026822 1.00000	PBV	0.126265	0.638067	0.249227	-0.026822	1.000000

Note: CSR is total economic, social and employee indicator item disclosure divided into 91 items. PROF is profitability using ROA, SIZ is log natural total assets, IOW is institutional ownership ratio, and PBV is a price to book value.

To test the effect of institutional ownership, CSR, and some other control variables on firm value, we estimate the following model:  $PBV = \beta 0 + \beta 1 CSR + \beta 2 IOW + \beta 3 PROF + \beta 4 SIZ + \varepsilon$ , where CSR is CSRD score, IOW represents institutional ownership variables (a portion of shares owned by other institutions), and control variables: log natural of total assets for firm size (SIZ), and ROA for profitability (PROF). Firm fixed effects are included to control time-invariant omitted factors and economic conditions.

T<sup>3</sup> le 3 shows the partial impact of variable CSR, institutional ownership (IO), and other control variables. The regression results are reported in Table 3. We presen 28 at all coefficients of main variables are positive and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Regarding the control variables, the results show 29 to only firm size is positively associated with the PBV, while profitability is insignificant. The model regression examines the relationship between CSR, institutional ownership, corporate variables and firm value. The regression results support all the hypotheses concerning the relationships between CSR, institutional ownership and control variables, exc 3 t for variable profitability.

The first hypothesis (H1) of the studies based on the corporate citizenship theory, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy theory. The hypothesis is that corporate social responsibility positively impacts firm value. Based on the regression result, shown in [2] following table 3, the coefficient of C1 is almost consistently positive and significant on the PBV (p < 0.01). This result confirms the first hypothesis. It is also consistent with the corporate citizenship, stakeholder theories, and legitimacy theory, which state that managers manage and use corporate (financial and non-financial) resources on CSR activities that positively impact firm performance. [98][98][98][98][98][98][98][98][105][105][105][105][105][105][105][102][102][102][97][90][90][90][90][90] confirmed the effects of Corporate Social Performance (CSP) on f5n performance, which have been explained using stakeholder theory, then argue that Social Responsibility (SR) is a valuable and non-substitutable resource that can, in and of itself, lead to a competitive advantage, or lead to the acquisition and development 5 tangible and intangible assets that ultimately determine a firm's competitive advantage. CSP also suggest that firms should be ave in an SR manner often results in accrued legitimacy and thus higher first-cial performance.

Empirically, this finding is consistent with the findings of [21], [99]–[101]. Over the past few decades, corporate social resp(3 ibility (CSR) has become the company's standard strategy for increasing corporate value and competitiveness. Extensive research has documented the positive impact of CSR, which are higher corporate value, lower capital costs, lower high leverage costs, higher credit ratings, higher cash holding values, and better quality of income; as a corporate CSR portfolio policy [13], [14], [16], [19], [21], [101]–[103].

Table 3. Empirical I   Variable	Coefficient	Prob.	Sig
CSR	0.56412	0.00000	***)
PROFIT	-0.00967	0.70610	

SIZE	-0.04804	0.10069	*	
INST	0.27121	0.00000	***)	
С	0.00736	0.94060		
17 R-squared	0.977337	0.177194		
Adjusted R-squared	0.975229	0.064388		
Log-likelihood	154.9411	-6.247544		
F-statistic	463.5978	-6.052628	***)	
Prob(F-statistic)	0	-6.173885	***)	
Note: The dependent variable is a firm value measured by price to book value. Independent variables are corporate soci 45 esponsibility and institutional ownership. The control variable is size measured by log natural 55 l assets and profitability measured by F1A. ***, **, *Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.				

The second hypothesis (H2) of the study is based on agency theory with asymmetric information and states that; institutional ownership is positively impacts firm value relationships. The result shows that coefficient of institutional ownership is positive and significant (p  $\{1\},01$ ). So, this result confirms the agency's role of institutional ownership in CSR and firm value mechanism. Empirically, this finding is consistent with the findings of [21], [99]–[101].

Recent studies have confirmed this line of reasoning 3 nding that institutional ownership might positively impact CSR activities. Institutional ownership that values social responsibilities highly is more likely to drive firms to engage in these activities. Moreover, institutional ownership, which may be l19-term investors, is concerned about CSR activities [104], [105]. Moreover institutional investigs or owners have an informational advantage in evaluating a firm's prospects. They may be more willing to exploit the economies of scope in evaluating firm quality and have better information, resulting in institutions' foreknowledge of firms' performance [106].

The third and 17<sup>th</sup> hypothesis (H3 and H4) of the study is control varial 28 to confirm the effect of the independent variable on firm value. The results sh 47 that the firm's only size has a positive and significant coefficient on the PB 41 p < 0.01). This result shows that the larger the company, the larger the firm's value. The size of the Company has a significant positive effect on the value of the firm because the company shows good growth, then signals to potential investors that the company have good and stable management. Thus, it makes many investors buy the company's shares, which can directly increase its value. Large cor 46 nice have the resources (financial and non-financial) than sm 21 companies. In large firms, the resources may be valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, and non-substitutable that provide the foundation to develop firm capabilities and lead to superior performance over time. The resources may provide value added to customers and creates advantages over competitors.

#### Conclusion

The study's hypothesis is formulated with the help of agency theory, corpolle citizenship theory, stakeholder theory, effective monitoring hypothesis, and information asymmetry theory. The result ch tested this hypothesis by selecting a sample of 48 firms years from 12 companies listed on the Indonesia stock exchange

(IDX) from 2017 to 2)20. Based on the analysis, the study concluits that CSR and institutional ownership as main variables are positively related to firm performance? The study confirmed corporate citizenship and stakeholder theory in explaining CSR, governance structure and firm per 29 mance relationships. The study also confirmed agency theory and asymmetric information in explaining the relationship between institutional ownership and the firm's performance.

We conclude that institutional ownership in the firm's ownership structure as the corporate governance mechanism stimulates the corporations to participate in 1 SR activities actively and then impact firm performance. Moreover, it concludes that institutional ownerships in the firms' ownership structure effectively monitor the management and ensure such policies tha 20 able the corporation to achieve long-term growth and profitability. Even the corporate social responsibilities and their managers have been discussed since the 1950s [107], and yet no consensus about progress has been achieved in the corporate social responsibility/corporate social performance literature; this study might expand and enlight the existing literature by identifying su(9) variables which play an important role in determining the volume of CSR activities performed by the company. The study further suggests that there is a need to investigate further this relationship from the perspective of sustainable development and zero-carbon issues.

# Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Institutional Ownership, and Firm Value

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